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Searching for Law While Seeking Justice:
The Difficulties of Enforcing International
Humanitarian Law in International Criminal Trials
BY BENJAMIN PERRIN*
Le droit p~nal international se situe i la crois6e
du droit international public, du droit humani-
taire international, du droit pour la protection
des personnes et des lois p~nales nationales. La
sagesse conventionnelle voulant que les doc-
trines du droit international public applicables
aux diff6rends entre 6tats se transposent ais6-
ment aux poursuites p6nales internationales
visant des individus nuit A notre compr6hension
de l'interrelation entre ces sources de droit.
Une &ude approfondie des certaines decisions
du Tribunal p6nal international, pour l'ex-
Yougoslavie et pour le Rwanda, d6montre que
ces tribunaux ne peuvent pas s'en tenir aux
sources classiques du droit international public
pour r6gler les cas difficiles. D'ailleurs, l'ap-
proche exp6rientielle utilis& pour la refonte de
ces sources dans l'Article 21 du Statut de Rome de
]a Cour pinalc internationale n'a pas rtsolu les ten-
sions fondamentales inhbrentes dans la tradition
du droit p6nal international.
Tant dans l'optique de ces tribunaux sp&iaux
modernes que dans le Statut de Rome, prtend
l'auteur, la d6cision des cas 6pineux repose sur
un choix judiciaire hautement discr~tionnaire
entre deux normes concurrentes : d'une part, la
necessit6 d'61ar~ir la protection humanitaire lors
de conflits armes, un ideal bien pr6sent en droit
humanitaire international, en particulier dans la
clause Martens; d'autre part, un souci de justice
plus 6quitable envers les pr6venus, un ideal qui
sainscrit dans le corps grandissant des lois pour la
protection internationale des personnes et codi-
U A I'Article 21(3) du Statut de Rome. Cet article
tente d'6lucider ces tensions fondamentales qui
existent dans la jurisprudence p6nale interna-
tionale A une &ape importante o6 la CPI com-
mence ses audiences dans une s&ie d'affaires.
International criminal law finds itself at the
confluence of public international law, interna-
tional humanitarian law, human rights law and
national criminal laws. Our understanding of
the interrelationship between these sources of
law has been hampered by the conventional
wisdom that public international law doctrines
applicable to disputes between states can be
readily transposed to the international criminal
prosecution of individuals.
A detailed analysis of selected decisions of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda demonstrates that these
tribunals could not simply rely on classical
sources of public international law to resolve
difficult cases. Further, the experimental
approach taken to recasting these sources of law
in Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court has not resolved fun-
damental tensions inherent in the international
criminal law tradition.
Both at the modern ad hoc tribunals and in the
Rome Statute, it is argued that difficult cases are
decided based on a highly discretionary selection
by judges between two competing norms. On
one hand, there is the need to enhance humani-
tarian protection during armed conflict, an ideal
embedded in international humanitarian law
and particularly the Martens Clause. On the
other hand, there is the aim of maximizing fair-
ness to the accused, an ideal enshrined in the
growing body of international human rights law
and codified in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.
This article seeks to illuminate these fundamen-
tal tensions within the international criminal law
jurisprudence at a foundational moment when
the ICC begins hearing its first set of cases.
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia; Faculty Associate, Uu Institute for
Global Issues and Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies; LL.M. (honours), McGill University, Faculty of
Law; I.D., University of'bronto, Faculty of Law; Member of the Law Society of Upper Canada; Clerkship,
Supreme Court of Canada.
This article is adapted from a thesis completed under the supervision of (then) Professor Patrick Healy at
the McGill University, Faculty of Law, now Justice of the Court of Quebec, Criminal and Penal Division, in
Montreal. I am most grateful for his insight and encouragement. The views expressed herein are only those
of the author.
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Searching for Law While Seeking Justice:
The Difficulties of Enforcing International
Humanitarian Law in International Criminal Trials
BY BENJAMIN PERRIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Holding individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law was once a very controversial proposition. Individual criminal responsibility is
now firmly established at the international and domestic levels to enforce interna-
tional humanitarian law obligations contained both in treaties and, in some cases,
customary international law. However, the legal architecture of this system of inter-
national humanitarian law enforcement remains incomplete and under-explored.
International criminal law finds itself at the confluence of public internation-
al law, international humanitarian law, human rights law and national criminal laws.
Understanding the interrelationship between these sources of law has been hampered
by the conventional wisdom that public international law doctrines applicable to dis-
putes between states can be readily transposed to the international criminal prosecu-
tion of individuals. This article aims to contribute to our understanding of the
challenges faced by international criminal tribunals in attempting to decide legal
issues that have no clear answers based on existing articulations of applicable law.
One of the main findings of this research is that international criminal law is
a hybrid legal tradition in which the constant tension between divergent sources of
law are resolved in difficult cases not by resorting to well-established doctrines of
public international law as often claimed, but rather by judicial discretion. This dis-
cretion is often exercised in a manner consistent with Patrick Glenn's theory of
"transnational common laws" which posits that persuasive, non-binding norms that
transcend national laws operate in the background and may be drawn upon to address
gaps in applicable law.1 Furthermore, one of the principal persuasive reasons for opt-
ing to follow one transnational common law over another is the favouring of one side
I. H. Patrick Glenn, "Transnational Common Laws" (2006) 29 Fordham Int'l L.I. 457 IGlenn, "Transnational
Common Laws"l.
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of a fundamental tension in the international criminal law tradition: expanding
humanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness to the accused.
The first part of this article examines decisions of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) where intractable substantive and procedural issues have arisen in
attempting to apply the traditional sources of public international law and its inter-
pretative doctrines to previously unanswered legal questions. At the same time, inter-
national human rights law has demonstrated an increasingly strong normative force
in the evolution of this body of jurisprudence. As the research presented in this arti-
cle demonstrates, gaps have arisen in practice at these modern ad hoc tribunals that
could not be filled by resort to the traditional sources of public international law.
These gaps have largely been caused by problems in identifying customary interna-
tional law and where differences between national laws have been discovered. In
resolving these dilemmas, it is argued that international judges have been required to
choose between two sides of a competing tension that flows from the core aspects of
human rights law and international humanitarian law: ensuring fairness to the
accused versus expanding humanitarian protection for victims.
The second part of this article critically evaluates Article 21 of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court,2 which is the first attempt in an international treaty
to define applicable law for international criminal law. The aims of this provision are
explained and the implications of its split from the traditional public international law
sources are explored. Efforts in the Rome Statute to restrain judicial discretion in
defining existing law are reviewed in light of these findings. In this context, Article
21 is critically evaluated. This provision is found to have an inherent risk of being
indeterminate and inconsistently applied. Article 21 authorizes the application of dif-
ferent laws to different accused persons. This is a troubling concept in criminal pro-
ceedings because it opens the door to judicial activism in ways not fully appreciated
by the framers of the Rome Statute, who generally intended to limit the scope of
judge-made law in comparison to the modern ad hoc tribunals. These challenges to
the enforcement of international humanitarian law need to be exposed before they
can be effectively addressed.
2. 17 June 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (entered into force I July 20 0 2) lRome StatuteI.
3. Nuremberg Rules, in Agreementfor the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
82 U.N.TS. 279 (entered into force 8 August 1945).
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II. DIFFICULTIES WITH APPLICABLE LAW AT THE
AD HOC TRIBUNALS
While the statutes of the modern ad hoc tribunals are more detailed than the
Nuremberg Charter' and the Tokyo Charter, they similarly did not include a definition
of applicable law.5 Some observers believe that this occurred because of "political
considerations," namely that it would be difficult to obtain agreement among states
on what law(s) should be applied. 6 M. Cherif Bassiouni has observed that matters that
were unaddressed in the statutes of the legacy and modern ad hoc tribunals "have been
dealt with on an ad hoc and sometimes in an improvised manner."7
There was no international criminal code in the mid-1 990s when the ad hoc tri-
bunals were created, national legal traditions varied in their identification of sources
of criminal laws, and international humanitarian law offered no guidance on how to
conduct a criminal trial. As a result, it was thought that resort to general public inter-
national law was a logical place to find broadly defined sources of international crim-
inal law. Specifically, judges of the modern ad hoc tribunals adopted Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court ofJustice as their own to provide a normative super-
structure to define applicable sources of international criminal law:8
4. Charter of the International Military Tribunalfor the Far-East (proclaimed on 19 January 194-6 by special procla-
mation of General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander in the Far East for the Allied Powers), online:
The Avalon Project <http: / www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm>.
5. See Statute of the International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, UN
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th Mtg., Annex, UN Doc. S/827 (1993) IICTY Statutel, art. 2; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Other Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of Neighboring States, S.C. Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 Mtg., Annex, UN Doc S/955
(1994) ICTR Statutej, art. 4. (These statutes did, however, authorize the application of various international
treaties, including grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which include: Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No. I), 12
August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 316; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded. Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention No. II), 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No. I11), 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention No.
IV), 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, and, additionally in the case of the ICTR, serious violations of
Protocol I1; Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610.
6. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc.,
2003) at 267.
7. Ibid. at 263.
8. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, IT-95-17/ I-A, Declaration of Judge Patrick Robinson (21 July 2000) at
note 10 (International Criminal Trilunal for the ForncrYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online:
ICTY <http:www.un.org.icty /cases-e/index-e.htm> IFurundzijal; Prosecutor r. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A,
Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah (7 October 1997) at para. 40
(International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTY
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htn> lErdemovic, Judges McDonald and Vohrahj; Prosecutor v.
Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/I-A, Declaration of Judge David Hunt (24 March 2000) at note I (International
Criminal Tribunal for the F)rmerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTY
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Article 38
].The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such dis-
putes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules express-
ly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.9
Commentators have explicitly indicated the need for these sources of law to be "sub-
ject to the principles of legality which derive from general principles of law ...."'1
Likewise, in interpreting their statutes, the modern ad hoc tribunals imported
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" to provide the inter-
pretive canons of international criminal law, 2 despite the fact that the statutes of
these tribunals were created under United Nations (UN) Security Council resolu-
tions and are not, strictly speaking, international treaties.
The implications of the modern ad hoc tribunals incorporating these public
international law concepts into international criminal law have been largely ignored.
Understanding the problems that arose in building the early foundation of this area of
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm>. See also Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ICTR-97-20-A,
Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen (31 May 2000) at note 20 (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.lCTR.org>; Prosecutor v.Jean Bosco Barayagwiza,
ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor's Request for Review of Reconsideration) (31 March 2000) at
para. 20 (international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTR
<http://www.ICTR.org>.
9. Statute of the International Court ofJustice 119781 I.C.J. Acts & Doc. 5 at art. 38(1), online: International Court
of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org> IiCJ Statutel.
10. Bassiouni, supra note 6 at 4.
II. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.TS. 331, arts. 31-32,Can.T.S. 1980 No. 37
[ Vienna Convention].
12. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic et al., IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to jurisdiction (12
November 2002) at para. 63 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber),
online: ICTY <http: / /www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm>; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic et al., IT-94-1 -A,
Judgment (15 July 1999) at para. 300 (International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Appeals
Chamber), online: ICTY <http://www.un.org/ICTY/cases-e/index-e.htm>; Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic et
al., IT-95-9, Decision on Motion for judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others (18 October
2000) at para. 47 (International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY
<http://wvw.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htn>; Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Reasons for
Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel (22 September 2004) at para. 31 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia,Trial Chamber), online: ICTY <http://www.un.org/ICTY/cases-
e/index-e.htm>. See also Prosecutor v. Thioneste Bagosoro and 28 Others, ICTR-98-37-A, Decision on the
Admissibility of the Prosecutor's Appeal From the Decision of a Confirming Judge Dismissing an Indictment
Against Th~oneste Bagosora and 28 Others (8 June 1998) at para. 28 (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.lCTR.org>; Prosecutor ,.Joseph Kanyabashi, ICTR-
96-15-A, Joint Separate and Concurring Opinion of Judge WangTieya and Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia (3 June
1999) at para. II (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,Trial Chamber), online: ICTR
<http: //www.ICTR.org>.
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law helps us to identify persistent tensions within the emerging international crimi-
nal law tradition and serves as a baseline for assessing the approach to applicable law
taken in the Rome Statute. The case law of the ICTY and the ICTR demonstrates the
difficulties of importing general public international law doctrines designed to deal
with legal disputes between states "based on a consensual relationship between co-
equal sovereign states.""3
A. Problems With Elaborating the Sources of International Criminal
Law
With respect to sources of law, most of the difficulties arise with respect to Article
38(i)(c) of the ICJ Statute, which refers to "the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations." 4 In their Joint and Separate Opinions in Erdemovic, Judges
McDonald and Vohrah of the ICTY Appeals Chamber state "that one purpose of this
article is to avoid a situation of non-liquet, that is, where an international tribunal is
stranded by an absence of applicable legal rules.""u In actually deriving these general
principles, these judges described their approach as follows:
lilt is generally accepted that the distillation of a "general principle of law recognised by
civilised nations" does not require the comprehensive survey of all legal systems of the
world as this would involve a practical impossibility and has never been the practice of
the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals which have had
recourse to Article 38(1 )(c) of the ICJ Statute .... 'In light of these considerations, our
approach will necessarily not involve a direct comparison of the specific rules of each of
the world's legal systems, but will instead involve a survey of those jurisdictions whose
jurisprudence is, as a practical matter, accessible to us in an effort to discern a general
trend, policy or principle underlying the concrete rules of that jurisdiction which com-
ports with the object and purpose of the establishment of the International Tribunal. I
There are, however, several problems with the approach described by Judges
McDonald and Vohrah, despite its obvious pragmatic justification. First, they provide
no answer for how extensive a survey of national legal systems is required. In the
same case, Judge Stephen held that "no universal acceptance of a particular principle
by every nation within the main systems of law is necessary before lacunae can be
filled; it is enough that 'the prevailing number of nations within each of the main fam-
ilies of laws' recognize such a principle." 7 By "families of laws," it is highly probable
13. Bassiouni, supra note 6 at II.
14. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 38(I)(c).
15. Erdemovic, Iudges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 8 at para. 57.
16. Ibid.
17. Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen (7 October
1997) at para. 25 (International Criminal Tribunal for the rI)rmerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online:
ICTY <http://wws :un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm> lemphasis addedl JErdemovic, Judge Stephenl.
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that Judge Stephen is referring to the common and civil law traditions, in all but the
rarest cases. Jurisdictions which are accessible "as a practical matter" clearly import
institutional considerations into the equation. Indeed, law only travels where it is
known and in a language that is understood by its adherents. I8
Second, there may be a degree of incommensurability between the legal fam-
ilies or traditions towards which the modern ad hoc tribunals have turned to. There
are significant theoretical and practical limitations in resorting to national laws, which
are situated in vastly different legal systems, to resolve isolated and narrow questions
for international criminal law. In Simic, Judge Hunt recognized this problem in the
context of international rules of evidence:
It is not easy to discover general principles of law in relation to this issue which are
recognised by the domestic laws of (all) civilised nations. This is because most civil law
systems have detailed statutory provisions in relation to evidence which is the subject of
claims of confidentiality, whereas most common law systems leave it to the courts to
determine where the balance lies between competing public interests. It is therefore nec-
essary, in my view, to commence from first principles. 19
In Delalic, the ICTY Trial Chamber approved a highly discretionary power of the
judges to fill gaps in the rules of procedure and evidence by making eclectic use of
national laws of their choice:
Whilst not being bound by national rules of evidence, it seems to the Trial Chamber that
the Chambers can, where appropriate, be guided by such national rules. Hence, the
Chambers may in their discretion apply rules of evidence which will best favour the determination of
the matter before them. In any case, such laws must be consistent with the spirit of the
Statute and general principles of law.
20
This approach is codified in Rule 89(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
both of the modern ad hoc tribunals, enacted by the judges of these tribunals:
In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply rules of evi-
dence which ,will best favour afair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with
the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.
2 1
18. H. Patrick Glenn, On Common Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 62 lGlenn, On Common Laws].
19. Prosecutor v. Bladole Simic et al., IT-95-9, Ex Parte and Confidential Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt
on Prosecutor's Motion for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness (27 July 1999), at para. 24
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm> [Simicl.
20. Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al., IT-96-2 I, Decision on the Motion to Allow Witness K, L, and M to Give
TheirTestimony by Means of Video-Link Conference (28 May 1997) at para. 7 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia,Trial Chamber), online: ICTY
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm> [emphasis addedl [Delalicl.
21. International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
La, Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc.
IT/32 (1994), as amended, r. 89(B). See also International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, UN Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (1995), as amended, r. 89(B) [emphasis addedl.
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These statements differ sharply from a faithful application of Article 38(1) of the ICJ
Statute, thus reinforcing the origins of international criminal law as driven by judicial
discretion, given its long-standing absence of an external institutional framework to
enact, amend and repeal the law that is applied.22 To develop this point further, it is
helpful to introduce a legal theory which offers an alternative explanatory perspec-
tive of the reasoning behind decisions of the modern ad hoc tribunals in difficult cases
where lacunae in formal sources are apparent.
Patrick Glenn's theory of transnational common laws offers some promising
insights when applied to international criminal law. According to Glenn, transnation-
al common laws have "no obligatory or mandatory content," yield to particular laws
(meaning that they largely fulfill a "gap filling" function), and depend on "persuasion
and collaboration, amongst jurists, amongst judges." While Glenn's theory has been
"hampered by the idea that the source of all law is the nation-state"2 4 it has the poten-
tial for greater purchase in this emergent international tradition, which is not
restrained by the exclusivity of the domestic law of any given state. The above state-
ments interpreting the applicable law at the modern ad hoc tribunals come very close
to applying these transnational common laws, which operate in the background and
appear when hard cases present themselves.25 Further evidence of this having taken
place in practice is considered later, demonstrating that "transnational 'judicial dia-
logue '' 2 6 is part of the international criminal law tradition in order to transmit infor-
mation. Indeed, the concept of "general principles of law" has been seen in other
contexts to provide a "liaison" between national laws.27 Similarly, Michle Buteau and
Gabril Oosthuizen have sought to demonstrate that substantive and procedural lacu-
nae in the statutes of the modern ad hoc tribunals are filled by resorting to the inher-
ent, implied, or incidental powers of the judges to resolve such matters.28 At this
stage of development of the international criminal law tradition, the final component
of Glenn's transnational common laws theory--"the recognition of different groups
of people to whom different laws could be applied" 9-has yet to fully materialize,
but has the potential to do so at the ICC based on Article 21 (1 )(c) of the Rome Statute,
as discussed further in Part Ill.
22. In this regard, the creation of the Assembly of States Parties for the ICC is a major institutional development.
23. Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 18 at 62, 45.
24. Glenn, "Transnational Common Laws," supra note I at 457.
25. Glenn, On Common Lairs. supra note 18 at 20.
26. Glenn, "Transnational Common Laws," supra note I at 466.
27. Glenn, On Common Lairs, supra note 18 at 49.
28. Michele Buteau & Gabriel Oosthuizen, "When the Statute and Rules are Silent: The Inherent Powers of the
rribunal" in Richard May et al., eds., Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 65 at 80.
29. Glenn, On Common Laws. supro note 18 at 63. Glenn also refers to the theory as "relational common laws."
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The hypothesis that judges at the modern ad hoc tribunals fill lacunae in inter-
national criminal law in a manner consistent with Glenn's transnational common laws
theory, as opposed to adherence to Article 38(1) of the IC/ Statute, is likely to be con-
troversial. *0 The aim at this stage, however, is not to provide a normative theory but
a descriptive one. Glenn's theory is very different from engaging in a detailed com-
parative analysis of state practice and evidence of opinio juris for the purpose of declar-
ing a rule of customary international law or finding a general principle of law within
the meaning of Article 38(1)(b),(c) of the ICJ Statute. This distinction was implicitly
recognized in Furundzija by Judge Robinson who began by noting that "[iut is perfect-
ly proper, therefore, to examine national decisions on a particular question in order
to ascertain the existence of international custom,"3 but then back-tracked to deny
that any such use of national laws was being made in the judgment:
Although the Judgement examines provisions in the European Convention on Human
Rights, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, decisions from some common
law countries-the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa and the United States-and
observes the "trend in civil law jurisdictions," it does not do so for the purpose of ascertaining
whether there is any relevant rule of customary international law.
The finding which the Chamber makes based upon this examination is that 'there is a gen-
eral rule that a Judge should not only be subjectively free from bias, but also that there
should be nothing in the surrounding circumstances which objectively gives rise to an
appearance of bias.'
32
B. The Implications of Public International Law Interpretive Doctrines
The serious implication of wholesale importation of general public international law
interpretive doctrines into the international criminal law tradition has also been largely
unexplored. While a comparative analysis of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
and national criminal law doctrines of interpretation is beyond the scope of the present
analysis, it suffices to recognize that important variances exist, flowing from the basic fact
that international rules of interpretation are of general application to disputes between
states and do not typically involve the liberty interest of individuals. These international
interpretive doctrines are intended to be fairly exhaustive, authorizing extensive use of
supplementary materials where required. The consequences of these realizations for
international criminal proceedings have already become apparent at the ICTY.
30. One of the most ardent opponents of this view would be Judge Cassese who stated that "Iwlhenever refer-
ence to national law is not commanded expressly, or imposed by necessary implication, resort to national
legislation is not warranted. Also, where national laws must be considered, Judge Cassese notes that "the
normal attitude of international courts is to try to assimilate or transform the national law notion so as to
adjust it to the exigencies and basic principles of international law." Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22,
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese (7 October 1997), at para. 3 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTY
<http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm> [Erdemovic, Judge Cassese].
31. Furundzija, supra note 8 at para. 28 1.
32. Ibid. at paras. 285-86 lemphasis addedl.
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Defence counsel in Hadzihasanovic challenged the use of Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention3" before the ICTY Appeals Chamber. In that case, it was argued
that "the object and purpose of the [ICTY] Statute cannot be relied upon to deter-
mine whether command responsibility in the context of internal armed conflicts was
law in 1993."34The unspoken assumption in this statement relates back to the seem-
ingly irreconcilable aims of extending humanitarian protection and ensuring full
respect for the rights of the accused. In that case, defence counsel implicitly argued
that the UN Security Council did not have the power to criminalize behaviour that
was not illegal at the time, even if it would extend humanitarian protection, because
to do so would violate the principle of legality.
In a partial dissenting opinion in this case, Judge Shabuddeen explicitly dis-
cussed the relationship between the interpretive rules set out in the Vienna Convention
and the maxim in dubio pro reo (uncertainty in the law must be interpreted in favour of
the accused). Due to-the relative exhaustiveness of international interpretive doc-
trines, the maxim which is a fundamental interpretive principle in many national sys-
tems was essentially eviscerated, demonstrating the repercussions of relying on public
international law interpretive canons to resolve international criminal law issues:
Paragraph 120 of the interlocutory appeal pleads that "Julncertainty in the law must be
interpreted in favour of the accused." As I understand the injunctions of the maxim in
dubio pro reo and of the associated principle of strict construction in criminal proceedings,
those injunctions operate on the result produced by a particular method of interpretation
but do not necessarily control the selection of the method. The selection of the method in
this case is governed by the rules of interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. It is only if the application of the method of interpretation prescribed by the
Convention results in a doubt which cannot be resolved by recourse to the provisions of
the Convention itself-an unlikely proposition-that the maxim applies so as to prefer the
meaning which is more favourable to the accused. In my view, that is not the position
here: there is no residual doubt.
35
At the same time that the modern ad hoc tribunals have grappled with using public
international law sources and doctrines to enforce international humanitarian law,
they have had to deal with a growing body of international human rights law.
33. Vienna Convention, supra note I I, arts. 31-32.
34. Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihosanovic et ol., IT-01-47-PT, Interlocutory Appeal on Decision on Joint Challenge to
Jurisdiction (Defence Motion) (27 November 2002) at paras. 94-96 (International CriminalTribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTY <http: / /wwwun.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm>.
35. Prosecutor v. En'er Hadzihosanovic et al.., IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabudden (16
July 2003) at para. 12 (International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online:
ICTY <http)://ww"s.un.org/icty/hadzihas/appea;/decision-e/030716.htm> lemphasis added].
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C. International Human Rights Law as a Dynamic Normative Force
The expansion of international human rights law after World War 11, created and cod-
ified in large measure through international treaties, has played a significant and
ongoing role in generating norms that have infused the international criminal law tra-
dition since the advent of the modern ad hoc tribunals. This has been particularly
important to international criminal procedure, but has infused various aspects of sub-
stantive law as well.The ICTY Trial Chamber went so far as to state in Furundzija that
"Itihe general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and
indeed the very raison d'9tre of international humanitarian law and human rights law;
indeed in modern times it has become of such paramount importance as to perme-
ate the whole body of international law."
3 6
After the creation of the United Nations, a litany of treaties were adopted and
resolutions were passed to expand the body of international human rights law. By the
time the modern ad hoc tribunals were created, international standards for the fair
and proper conduct of criminal proceedings in national courts had already taken on
a transnational character, making it impossible for international criminal tribunals to
ignore these standards." These norms continue to develop, evolving independently of
international criminal proceedings through international human rights bodies,
regional human rights courts and national courts. For example, the statutes of the
modern ad hoc tribunals, which were adopted by the UN Security Council, include
detailed provisions guaranteeing the rights of the accused which are largely taken
from Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3 8
Richard May and Marieke Wierda argue that trial fairness, as understood in
international human rights law, has been the factor motivating the modern ad hoc tri-
bunals to reconcile differences in national legal traditions. May andWierda also argue
that regional human rights law, in particular as expounded by the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, has proven to be a powerful normative source of
international criminal law principles of evidence and procedure, such as the concept
of "equality of arms." 39 Christoph Safferling takes the argument one step further,
arguing that the only way to bridge the gap between common and civil legal tradi-
36. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement (10 December 1998) at para. 183 (International
Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Trial Chamber 11), online: ICTY
<http://wvw.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/fur-tj981210e.pdf>.
37. Salvatore Zappala, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)
at 246.
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 14, Can. T.S.
1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976). See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, art. 21, and
ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 20.
39. Richard May & Marieke Wierda,"Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg,Tokyo,The Hague,
and Arusha" (1999) 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 725 at 728, 733, and n. 22.
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tions at the international level is "to find a consensus in a truly international criminal
procedure that all states can accept. In order to achieve this, the discussion must
begin with what states have already accepted, that is, universal human rights."40 This
suggests that there is added strength on the side of ensuring fairness to the accused in
the international criminal law tradition, perhaps at the cost of extending humanitar-
ian protection-the other competing aspect in this tension. Indeed, the normative
thrust of international human rights law has now been formally entrenched in Article
21(3) of the Rome Statute, which is discussed in detail in Part III, as part of this broad-
er trend in international criminal law. This provision states in part that "[t]he applica-
tion and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with
internationally recognized human rights ....- 41
D. Filling Gaps in Applicable Law in Practice
Moving from these theoretical findings, the following examines a selective review of
the jurisprudence of the modern ad hoc tribunals in which gaps have arisen due to
strict adherence to the public international law sources and interpretive doctrines
discussed above. This is relevant for three reasons: first, it suggests that the balance in
the international criminal law tradition between extending humanitarian protection
and maximizing fairness to the accused has been highly variable; second, it shows that
lacunae in international criminal law do not exist merely where there is no definition
of applicable law, but rather are a systematic concern that has not been addressed by
the adoption of a defacto articulation of applicable law (i.e. Article 38(1) of the IC]
Statute, discussed above). Therefore, there is no basis to assume that a de jure articu-
lation of sources of law, as in Article 21 of the Rome Statute, will definitively address
this concern;42 and third, this inquiry demonstrates that problems arising from the
hybrid character of international criminal law have been dealt with, at least in part,
by judges at the modern ad hoc tribunals treating national laws as constituting transna-
tional common laws (as described by Glenn, above) which the judges have drawn upon
based on their persuasive force. In this way, Article 21 (1 )(c) of the Rome Statute, dis-
cussed in Part III, can be understood as reflecting a codification of this approach
which eschews the prospect of deriving rules of international custom from national
laws, in favour of "general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of
legal systems of the world .... ,43 Over time, the cumulative effect of international
judicial decision-making on this basis is a body of persuasive jurisprudence, such that
40. Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001) at 366.
41. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 21(3).
42. This specific hypothesis is examined in Part III.
43. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 2 1(1)(c) [emphasis addedi.
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resort to national laws has become less and less necessary at the modern ad hoc tri-
bunals. As will be discussed in Part III, this process of building an international crim-
inal law tradition on the basis of persuasive, non-binding decisions has been
entrenched in Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute.44
1. Problems in Identifying International Custom
In many respects, the ICTY Appeals Chamber's decision on jurisdiction in Tadic is a
foundational case for the modern ad hoc tribunals, in large part because it is one of
the very first decisions rendered by an international criminal tribunal since the post-
World War II proceedings. This decision also affords a typical example of the way in
which these tribunals have approached the task of invoking various sources of law to
resolve questions that are not answered in the formal law of these tribunals (i.e. the
relevant provisions in their statutes, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
In Tadic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that violations of customary rules
governing internal armed conflicts may incur individual criminal responsibility. It
reached this conclusion-which, inter alia, extended the rule in international armed
conflicts established by the International Military Tribunal-by implicitly invoking
the Martens clause, 45 stating:
Principles and rules of humanitarian law reflect 'elementary considerations of humanity'
widely recognized as the mandatory minimum for conduct in armed conflicts of any
kind. No one can doubt the gravity of the acts at issue, nor the interest of the interna-
tional community in their prohibition.
46
Placing the Martens clause, whose role in international criminal law has been histor-
ically challenged, 47 so centrally in this decision has the effect of inserting a dynamic
normative vehicle for extending humanitarian protection in international criminal
law, clearly at the expense of the competing interests of ensuring fairness to the
accused. Without the Tadic decision on jurisdiction, many of the indictments issued
by the ICTY would be invalid.
44. See Rome Statute, ibid., art. 21(2) which provides: "The Court may apply principles and rules of law as inter-
preted in its previous decisions" lemphasis added].
45. The Martens clause is named after the Russian delegate who first proposed it at the Hague Peace
Conference in 1899, stating: "Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result
from the usages established between civilized nations,from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of public
conscience" lemphasis addedl. Cited in Theodor Meron, "The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and
Dictates of Public Conscience" (2000) 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 78 at 79.
4-6. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94--1 -AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (2 October 1995) at para. 129 (International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia,
Appeals Chamber), online: ICTY <http:/ /www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal /decision-e/5 1002.htm> [Tadic,
Appeal on Jurisdictionl.
47. See "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties" (1920)
14 Am. J. Int. L. 95 at 122, cited in Sheldon Glueck, "far Criminals, Their Prosecution &Punishment (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944) at 22; and Meron, supra note 45 at 88.
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The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic further added that customary interna-
tional law arrives at the same conclusion. State practice in the following jurisdictions
was cited: Belgium (statute); Germany (military manual); New Zealand (military
manual); United States (military manual); United Kingdom (military manual); for-
mer Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (criminal code); the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (decree law); and Nigeria (military manual, court martial and civil-
ian court decisions). 41 With respect to opinio juris, the Appeals Chamber relied solely
on several UN Security Council resolutions regarding the situation in Somalia.4 9 The
parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina were also found to have agreed in a
treaty to punish violations of international humanitarian law committed in the inter-
nal armed conflict.50
The ICTY's approach to identifying this very significant rule of customary
international law can hardly be classified as rigorous in either its depth or breadth of
analysis. Only eight jurisdictions were considered, just one of which was a non-
Western country. The persuasiveness of relying so heavily on the state practice of
jurisdictions which have not had to deal with internal armed conflicts is troubling.
Other than in the analysis of Nigerian law, there is only cursory citation of provisions
in military manuals and national legislation, and no doctrinal support or analysis is
provided to lend credibility to the ICTY's interpretation of these provisions. Again,
other than a few Nigerian cases, the actual uses of the legislative provisions that exist
to purportedly punish violations of international humanitarian law in internal armed
conflict are absent. Furthermore, no link is made whatsoever between state practice,
on the one hand, and opinio juris on the other. They are disjunctively treated-not
linked in either time or jurisdictional space.
Similar observations apply to the ICTR's reasoning in Kabiligi. In that case,
defence counsel claimed, inter alia, that the indictment was defective on the grounds that
it dealt with allegations before the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR.TheTrial Chamber
decided that "[als to the conspiracy charge . . . the limited temporal jurisdiction of the
Tribunal does not bar evidence of an alleged conspiracy of which the agreement was
made before 1994."S" In arriving at this conclusion, the Trial Chamber relied on an
Australian doctrinal text, case law of the House of Lords, and a decision of a U.S. mili-
tary tribunal. Based on these sources of law, the Trial Chamber concluded that the law
on conspiracy as it applies to temporal jurisdiction was "clear from the authorities. " 2
48. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 46 at paras. 106, 125 and 130-32.
49. Ibid. at para. 133.
50. Ibid. at para. 136.
5I. The Prosecutor v. Gratien Kabiligi et al.,, ICTR-96-34-1, Decision on the Defence Motions Objecting to a Lack
of Jurisdiction and Seeking to Declare the Indictment Void Ab Initio (13 April 2000) at para. 39
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber I11), online: ICTR
<http: / /69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Kabiligi/decisions/dcs20000413.htm>.
52. Ibid. at para. 43.
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The foregoing critique is significant because it fundamentally questions the
theoretical basis for seeking out customary international law rules to be applied in the
international criminal law tradition. It also suggests that the balance in this tradition
between extending humanitarian protection versus maximizing principles of a fair
defence has been strongly influenced by developments in international humanitarian
law and international human rights law-a trend confirmed by the Erdemovic case,
discussed below.
2. Reconciling Differences Between National Legal Traditions
A critical review of the jurisprudence of the modern ad hoc tribunals reveals many
instances where judges were required to answer questions which were unaddressed
in the formal law (i.e. the Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence) of the
respective tribunals by resorting to national laws-which themselves were vastly dif-
ferent or seen to be in conflict. Given such a divergence or conflict among national
legal sources, it cannot be argued that these judges were applying international cus-
tomary law, or "general principles of law." Yet they arrived at a definitive statement
of the law, sometimes opting to follow one legal tradition over another, and at other
times fashioning their own articulation of the appropriate rule. This body of practice
offers strong evidence of a basic element of the international criminal law tradition:
that it is largely based on judicial discretion in difficult cases, exercised consistent
with Glenn's theory of transnational common laws, and often based on favouring
either extending humanitarian protection or enhancing fairness to the accused.
The ICTY Trial Chamber decision on hearsay in Tadic is paradigmatic of the
above hypothesis. In that case, the parties disagreed on whether the common law or
civil law approach should prevail when resolving a legal question not explicitly
addressed in the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Defence counsel recog-
nized that national rules of evidence do not bind the ICTY, but argued that the adver-
sarial system of trial is more similar to common law jurisdictions, which generally
presumptively exclude hearsay evidence, with exceptions only where its probative
value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects.53 On the other side, the prosecu-
tion argued that ICTY judges are finders of fact in a manner akin to professional civil-
ian judges, where all relevant evidence is generally admissible." In resolving this
impasse, the Trial Chamber noted that there was no general rule excluding hearsay in
the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and cited Rule 89, discussed earlier.5 1The
Trial Chamber proceeded to examine the divergent civil and common law approach-
53. Prosecutor r. Dusko Tadic, IT-94--1 -T, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay (5 August 1996) at para. 2
(International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavria, Trial Chamber) ITadic, Hearsay Decision].
54. Ibid. at para. 3.
55. Ibid. at paras. 4-6.
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es to hearsay evidence, and noted that the ICTY itself is a"unique amalgam of civil and
common law features."56 In articulating its approach to hearsay evidence under inter-
national criminal law, the Trial Chamber stated that it would admit relevant evidence
which has probative value, "focusing on its reliability"" such that it "may be guided by,
but not bound to, hearsay exceptions generally recognized by some national legal sys-
tems." 8 Therefore, the Trial Chamber developed a sui generis9 articulation of the law
on hearsay by drawing from both common and civil law traditions-but not adopting
either completely-and justified this approach as falling within the scope of its Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, and as being "the most efficient and fair method."' Indeed,
a recent survey of ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence on evidentiary law has confirmed
that judges play a prominent law-making role in reconciling national legal traditions.6'
There was no attempt by the ICTYTrial Chamber to justify its solution as being a "rule
of international customary law" or "general principle of law." The Tadic decision on
hearsay may thus be viewed as a case of reconciling national legal traditions which are
non-binding, but persuasive sources of law for international criminal law.
In the Erdemovic decision on duress, it was not simply the parties, but also the
judges of the ICTY Appeals Chamber which were split on whether duress constituted
a complete defence to war crimes or crimes against humanity involving the killing of
innocent people. The five-member panel agreed that this question was unresolved in
the ICTY Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence and international treaties. They
also agreed that there was a rift between civilian jurisdictions that permitted duress as
a complete defence to all offences, and common law jurisdictions that generally denied
duress in cases of murder but treated it as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Despite
this consensus, there was deep division in the Appeals Chamber regarding the basis on
which the issue should be resolved, and four separate opinions were rendered.
The majority in Erdemovic, composed of Judges McDonald,Vohrah and Li, found
"that duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime
against humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings."6
56. Ibid. at para. 14.
57. Ibid. at para. 19.
58. Ibid.
59. This language was not formally used until the 1997 decision in Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al., IT-96-2 1,
Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad Landzo (I May 1997) at para. 15
(International CriminalTribunal for the FormerYugoslavia,Trial Chamler), online: ICTY
<http:/ /www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/70501 DE2.htm>.
60. Tadic, Hearsay Decision, supra note 53 at para. 19.
61. See May & Wierda, supra note 39 at 727: "Thus, the presentation of evidence has followed the 'adversarial'
model, whereas the rules governing the admissibility of evidence may be seen as more akin to the 'inquisito-
rial' model and leave wide discretion to the judges."
62. Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Judgement (7 October 1997) at para. 19 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTY
<http: //www.un.org/icty/er(lemovic/appeal/ judgement/erd-aj971007e.pdf>.
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They resolved the gap in international criminal law by explicitly resorting to "practical
policy considerations," namely the imperative of extending humanitarian protection to
deny duress as a defence to the killing of innocent people. Judges Cassese and Stephen
dissented, each writing separate opinions. Judge Cassese's denial of ambiguity in inter-
national criminal law on this issue is suspect, and his admission that if there was ambi-
guity, it should be resolved in favour of the accused is quite telling. For its part, Judge
Stephen's dissenting opinion mirrors Glenn's theory of transnational common laws,
with the civil law approach to duress being more persuasive and suitable to ensuring
fairness to the accused.
Judges McDonald and Vohrah began their analysis by citing Article 38 of the
ICJ Statute under a heading entitled "The Applicable Law."6 They considered custom-
ary international law and general principles of law to ascertain whether duress could
be a defence to the alleged offence. In evaluating the state of customary internation-
al law; case law of the post-World War II military tribunals was evaluated. The
Einsatzgruppen decision of the U.S. Military Tribunal was challenged for failing to cite
any authority for its holding that duress could be a complete defence. 64 They also
rejected judicial decisions from Germany, Belgium, Israel, France, the former
U.S.S.R., the former Yugoslavia, and Italy, which had been offered to support the
view of duress as a complete defence. 65 Turning to national legislation, they found
there was no uniform state practice. They observed the clear split between the civil
and common law traditions on this issue. Defence counsel provided evidence that at
least 14 civil law jurisdictions (including the former Yugoslavia) permit necessity or
duress to be exculpatory for all crimes. 66 However, Judges McDonald and Vohrah
noted that common law jurisdictions reject duress as a defence to murder, with the
exception of"a few states" in the U.S..67 They were unable to reconcile the diverse
approaches in national law, stating:
It is clear from the differing positions of the principal legal systems of the world that
there is no consistent concrete rule which answers the question whether or not duress is
a defence to the killing of innocent persons. It is not possible to reconcile the opposing
positions and, indeed, we do not believe that the issue should be reduced to a contest
between common law and civil law.
68
63. Erdemovic, Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 8 at para. 40.
64. Ibid. at para. 43, citing the U.S. Military Tribunal, which held: "Let it be said at once that there is no law
which requires that an innocent man must forfeit his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid committing
a crime which he condemns.The threat, however, must be imminent, real and inevitable. No court will pun-
ish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled to pull a lethal lever."
65. Ibid. at paras. 47-48.
66. Ibid. at para. 49.The jurisdictions cited included Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Italy, Finland, the
Netherlands, France, Germany, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and the former Yugoslavia.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid. at para. 72,
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To set out an applicable rule governing duress in the case, Judges McDonald and
Vohrah appealed to the "normative mandate for international criminal law."69 In so
doing, they explicitly opted to decide the case based on extending humanitarian pro-
tection, arguably at the expense of ensuring fairness to the accused, stating:
[Wle are operating in the realm of international humanitarian law which has, as one of
its prime objectives, the protection of the weak and vulnerable in such a situation
where their lives and security are endangered .... It must be our concern to facilitate the
development and effectiveness of international humanitarian law and to promote its aims and
application by recognising the normative effect which criminal law should have upon
those subject to them.
70
While rejecting duress as a defence on the basis of the policy underlying internation-
al humanitarian law, Judges McDonald and Vohrah still gave some credence to the
competing tension of international human rights law with respect to fairness to the
accused, noting that English judges have recognized that duress can operate as a mit-
igating factor at sentencing.7" Judges McDonald and Vohrah were unapologetic in
their explanation of the final basis for their decision to deny duress as a defence to the
offences alleged, indicating it is not grounded, strictly speaking, in pre-existing law:
We do not think our reference to considerations of policy are improper. It would be
naive to believe that international law operates and develops wholly divorced from con-
siderations of social and economic policy .... The approach we take does not involve a
balancing of harms for and against killing but rests upon an application in the context of
international humanitarian law of the rule that duress does not justify or excuse the
killing of an innocent person.
72
Similarly, Judge Li's concurring opinion was founded largely on extending humani-
tarian protection, but also explicitly drew on those national laws which are "best suit-
ed" to the context of the case. This approach demonstrated resort to the
persuasiveness of transnational common laws, such that "this International Tribunal
cannot but opt for the solution best suited for the protection of innocent persons."
73
The majority decision in Erdemovic, therefore, cannot be said to be grounded in
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, as these general doctrines of public international law
failed to provide an answer to the fundamental question at stake in Erdemovic, at least
according to the majority's reasoning.
69. Ibid. at para. 73.
70. Ibid. at para. 75 lemphasis addedI.
71. See ibid. at paras. 86-87.
72. Ibid. at paras. 78, 80.
73. Prosecutor i. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Judgement, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of ludge Li (7
October 1997) at para. 8 (International CriminalTribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber),
online: ICTY <http: / /www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd -asoli971007e.htm>.
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On the other side of the debate, Judge Cassese held in his dissenting opinion
that "international criminal law on duress is not ambiguous or uncertain."7 4 He pro-
ceeded by identifying four conditions which must be satisfied in order for duress to
provide a defence under international criminal law, based on "Itihe relevant case-law
[which] is almost unanimous"7 (i.e. severity of threat, no means of escape, propor-
tionality of means taken, and threat not self-induced). The case law cited by Judge
Cassese consisted of several decisions of the post-WorldWar II military tribunals, and
national decisions from the Netherlands, Israel and Canada. 76These provided, accord-
ing to Judge Cassese's reasoning, for a "general rule" of customary international law
that duress may offer a defence to an accused. Judge Cassese described the prosecu-
tion as attempting to fashion an exception in customary international law to disallow
duress as a defence for offences involving the killing of innocent persons." Judge
Cassese argued that "no special customary rule has evolved in international law on
whether or not duress can be admitted as a defence in case of crimes involving the
killing of persons."7 The logic applied by Judge Cassese on this point is questionable.
It could just as easily be argued that a general rule of international criminal law is that
the individual criminal responsibility of an accused can only be justified or excused
based on a defence recognized under international law. Since duress is not recognized
as a defence to the offences charged, and Judge Cassese falls short of finding a spe-
cific rule permitting duress as a defence to the killing of innocent persons, then the
purported defence would not exist.
Judge Cassese is harsh in his criticism of the majority opinions, which he char-
acterized as being based solely on "practical policy considerations." 79 While rejecting
policy considerations as a relevant basis of decisions by international criminal tri-
bunals, Judge Cassese nevertheless buttresses his position by invoking what could
reasonably be called policy considerations, stating that law "should not set intractable
standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and
brand as criminal any behaviour falling below those standards.""0 In a very revealing
passage, Judge Cassese stated that if there was ambiguity or a gap in international
criminal law concerning duress, then it would "be appropriate and judicious to have
recourse-as a last resort-to the national legislation of the accused, rather than to
moral considerations or policy-oriented principles," given that the accused was
"required to know those national criminal provisions and base his expectations on
74. Erdemovic, Judge Cassese, supra note 30 at para. 49.
75. Ibid. at para. 16.
76. Ibid. at note 10.
77. Ibid. at para. 18.
78. Ibid. at para. 40.
79. Ibid. at para. 11.
80. Ibid. at para. 47.
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their contents.""1 However, no authority is cited by Judge Cassese for filling gaps in
international criminal law by applying the national law of the accused. Instead, he
refers to the maxim in dubio pro reo (resolving doubt in favour of the accused).82
In the final dissenting opinion in Erdemovic, Judge Stephen disputed the per-
suasive authority of the post-World War II jurisprudence on the grounds that they
merely applied the national law with which they were most familiar. 3 Judge Stephen
examined general principles of law as articulated in Article 38(l)(c) of the JCJ Statute,
agreeing with the approach of Judges McDonald and Vohrah regarding the ability of
general principles to fill.lacunae in international law. 4 Characterizing the divergence
of the common law and civilian tradition on this issue, Judge Stephen simply indicat-
ed preference for the latter and justified this position based on favouring the tension
within international criminal law of ensuring fairness to the accused, "not only
because of the approach of the civil law but also as a matter of simple justice."85 Judge
Stephen rejected the competing principle of extending humanitarian protection, stat-
ing that it "is not achieved by the denial of a just defence to one who is in no position
to effect by his own will the protection of innocent life."8 6 This reasoning shows hints
of a rare attempt to harmonize the competing aims of international criminal law.
However, in a series of questionable moves, Judge Stephen seeks to declare a
general principle of law recognizing duress as a defence on the basis that a "general
principle governing duress is therefore more likely to be found in these general rules
[i.e. civil rules] than in specific exceptions which exist for particular crimes [i.e. com-
mon law rules]."87 With respect, this is merely a play-on-words with the word "gen-
eral" in "general principles of law." The existence of exceptions to rules of law in
national systems cannot reasonably invalidate those national laws from analysis. To the
contrary, their divergence from other approaches which do not recognize such
exceptions makes it more difficult to declare that a general principle of law exists.
Based on the preceding analysis, Judge Stephen purported to declare a narrow gen-
eral principle of law that could perhaps enable duress to operate on the facts alleged
by the accused in the case. 8
81. Ibid. at para. 49.
82. Ibid.
83. In Erdemovic, ludge Stephen, supra note 17 at para. 24, ludge Stephen held: "The post-Second World War
militarv tribunals do not appear to have acted in relation to duress in conscious conformity with the dictates
of international law."
84. Ibid. at para. 25.
85. Ibid. at para. 26 [emphasis addedl.
86. Ibid. at para. 65.
87. Ibid. at para. 63.
88. Ibid. at para. 66.
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The Erdemovic decision, therefore, represents a microcosm of the difficulties of
enforcing international humanitarian law through international criminal trials. It is a
harbinger of the fundamental questions governing the guilt or acquittal of an accused
which are likely to continue to fall within the gaps of international criminal law.
3. Precedent and an International Criminal jurisprudence
Once they have been made, what role do national and international judicial deci-
sions play in the international criminal law tradition? Consistent with Glenn's the-
ory of transnational common laws, we would expect them to play a persuasive, but
non-binding role. This is largely the approach which has been taken at the modern
ad hoc tribunals.
With respect to judicial decisions made outside its Chambers, the ICTY has
not considered itself to be "bound" by the decisions of other international courts or
tribunals such as the International Military Tribunal or International MilitaryTribunal
for the Far East (IMTFE), 9 but has stated that these are more persuasive than natio-
nal decisions:
In sum, international criminal courts such as the International Tribunal must always care-
fully appraise decisions of other courts before relying on their persuasive authority as to
existing law. Moreover, they should apply a stricter level of scrutiny to national decisions
than to international judgements, as the latter are at least based on the same corpus of law
as that applied by international courts, whereas the former tend to apply national lav, or
primarily that law, or else interpret international rules through the prism of national
legislation. 9"
In terms of its own jurisprudence, the treatment to be given to prior decisions of the
Trial and Appeals Chambers of the modern ad hoc tribunals is not explicitly addressed
in either their Statutes or Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 9 1 This situation presents
a dilemma given the position on this issue of various streams which feed into the
international criminal law tradition. While higher courts in the common law tradi-
tion may bind lower courts by their decisions, there is no similar legal requirement
in the civil law tradition. 92 In public international law, as in Article 59 of the ICJ
Statute,9 the doctrine of binding precedent is not strongly conceived.
89. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, IT-95-16, Judgement (14 January 2000) at para. 540 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia,Trial Chamber), online: ICTY
<http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2 /judgement/index.htm> lKupreskicl.
90. Ibid. at para. 542.
91. Claire Harris, "Precedent in the Practice of the ICTY" in May er aL, supra note 28, 341 at 341.
92. Discussed in Prosecutor v. Zlatko Alcksovski, IT-95-14/ I, judgement (24 March 2000) at para. 112
(International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTY
<http:/ /wwwun.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/judgement/index.htin> [Aleksovski, Appeals Judgementj.
93. ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 59 states: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case."
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In 2000, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski definitively stated that the
"ratio decidendi of its decisions is binding on Trial Chambers" owing to: the hierarchi-
cal structure of the tribunal; the need to ensure "certainty and predictability in the
application of the applicable law;" fairness to the accused because like cases must be
treated alike (favouring one of the fundamental poles in the international criminal law
tradition); and the intention of the UN Security Council in creating the tribunals
which "envisaged a tribunal comprising three trial chambers and one appeals cham-
ber, applying a single, unified, coherent and rational corpus of law."94 With respect to
decisions of Trial Chambers, the Appeals Chamber essentially adopted the shared
common law and civil law approach, stating that otherTrial Chambers may find such
decisions to be persuasive, but that they "have no binding force on each other."9
The fundamental question of whether the Appeals Chamber is bound by its own
prior decisions was also addressed in Aleksovski, where the prosecution argued for the
common law position of stare decisis which is only departed from if a previous decision
is "clearly erroneous and cannot stand."96 On the other hand, the defence argued that
"the Tribunal may apply only rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond
any doubt part of customary law, and the Report [of the UN Secretary General creat-
ing the ICTY] makes no mention of judicial precedent as a source of law."97 Resolving
this question, the Appeals Chamber observed that "[tihe trend which emerges from an
examination of common law jurisdictions is that their highest courts will normally con-
sider themselves bound by their previous decisions, but reserve the right to depart from
them in certain circumstances."" While the highest courts in civilian jurisdictions tend
in practice to follow their prior decisions, the Appeals Chamber noted that this is not
because such decisions are viewed as binding.99 International courts similarly do not
have a notion of binding precedent, but afford their prior decisions significant weight.
The Appeals Chamber found this practice to be non-determinative, and instead
resolved the issue based on the need for "certainty, stability and predictability in crim-
inal law" ' and the right of the accused to a fair trial which includes the right of appeal
where like cases are treated alike as well as where errors of law in past appellate deci-
sions are corrected. '0' The ultimate rule adopted in Aleksovski, therefore, was that "the
Appeals Chamber should follow its previous decisions, but should be free to depart
from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice." 102
94. Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, supra note 92 at para. 113.
95. Ibid. at para. 114.
96. Ibid. at para. 122.
97. Harris, supra note 91 at 346.
98. Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, supra note 92 at para. 92.
99. Ibid. at para. 93.
100. Ibid. at para. 101.
101. Ibid. at paras. 104-06.
102. Ibid. at para. 107.
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The approach of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski to the nature of prior
Appeals Chamber decisions may be seen as an attempt to reconcile the typically com-
peting aspects of the international criminal law tradition. By ensuring that decisions
of the Appeals Chamber are binding on Trial Chambers, and should generally be fol-
lowed by subsequent Appeals Chambers, international criminal law can develop over
time and be applied clearly and concisely, thus enhancing humanitarian protection.
Likewise, the rule encourages fairness to the accused by ensuring that like cases are
treated alike, but allows for the exception that a prior Appeals Chamber decision may
be disregarded where it is contrary to the interests of justice. This test, no doubt,
involves a high degree of judicial discretion.
Moving forward, it is pertinent to consider the extent to which the jurispru-
dence of the modern ad hoc tribunals may serve as persuasive, non-binding precedent
for the ICC. Only time will reveal the ultimate answer to this question, but it is
already apparent in the Rome Statute that some of the case law of the modern ad hoc
tribunals has been set aside. For example, the majority decision in Erdemovic regard-
ing the defence of duress was not followed in the drafting of the defences section of
the Rome Statute."3 Furthermore, how will the decisions of the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber, Trial Chamber, and Appeals Chamber be treated in other cases before the
ICC? Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute appears to retreat from the common law tra-
dition and the modern ad hoc tribunals, instead favouring an approach of mere per-
suasive authority akin to the civil tradition, stating: "Itihe Court may apply principles
and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions."'' "
E. Legacy of the Legal Architecture of the ICTY and ICTR
While the creation of the modern ad hoc tribunals makes it possible to conceive of an
emergent international criminal law tradition, the foregoing analysis shows that
attempts to theoretically define sources of law and interpretive principles solely by
reference to public international law has been insufficient. In practice, gaps which
have emerged in the defacto definition of applicable law taken from Article 38 of the
ICJ Statute have been filled by judicial discretion, drawing upon persuasive, non-
binding precedent from transnational common laws. In some cases, the persuasive
rationale went unstated by judges, or weak attempts have been made to justify their
decisions as fully consistent with general principles of public international law.
Notable instances in the jurisprudence have been presented to demonstrate that the
fundamental debate in the international criminal law tradition between enhancing
humanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness to the accused has been the turning
103. Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, An Introduction to the Law of the International Criminal Tribunals (Ardsley:
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2003) at 74. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 31(1 )(d).
104. Rome Statute, ibid., art. 21(2) [emphasis added].
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point in difficult cases. In rare instances, there have been attempts to reconcile these
competing aims which have been at the core of the international criminal law tradi-
tion since its birth. As these decisions have accumulated at the modern ad hoc tri-
bunals, a basic system of precedent has been adopted to attempt to achieve an agenda
of reconciling these aims.
Why, then, has the recent trend in international criminal law since the mod-
ern ad hoc tribunals been to attempt to codify the sources of applicable law, alter the
ways in which this body of law should evolve, and revise the type of precedent which
should apply?010 In particular, how does Article 21 of the Rome Statute differ from the
approach that has prevailed at the modern ad hoc tribunals? Does it purport to fill
gaps in international criminal law and, if so, how effective is it likely to be in doing
so? How does this protection affect the fundamental tensions in the international
criminal law tradition between enhancing humanitarian protection versus ensuring
fairness to the accused? How could the notion of transnational common laws operate
at the ICC consistent with, or in spite of, Article 21 of the Rome Statute? What is the
nature of past decisions of the ICC in this new system?
III. AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO APPLICABLE LAW:
ARTICLE 21 OF THE ROME STATUTE
The project of creating a permanent international criminal court has a long history,
but only really gained traction around the same time that the first modern ad hoc tri-
bunal was being established. Owing to the fact that the negotiation process of draft-
ing a statute for the ICC took place alongside the developments discussed in Part II,
the modern ad hoc tribunals continued to promulgate important jurisprudence well
after the Rome Statute was finalized.The thinking that went into the ICC represents an
effort to build on the early lessons from these tribunals, as well as an independent
exercise in redefining the international criminal law tradition, without the benefit of
the full experience of the modern ad hoc tribunals. There are many important differ-
ences between the Rome Statute and the substantive, procedural and evidentiary law
105. See e.g. Rome Statute, ibid., art. 21; United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No.
2000/15, On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences,
UNTAET/REG/2000/ 15 (6 June 2000), s. 3, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untatR/RegOOISE.pdf>; Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, adopted 16 January 2002, as amended to 14 May 2005, r. 72bis, online: SCSL
<http://www.sc-sl.org/rulesofprocedureandevidence.pd>; Statute of the Special Court frr Sierra Leone in
Report the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), arts. 14, 19(1), 20(3), online: SCSL
< http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.htnml>; Statute of the Iraqi SpecialTribunal, (10
December 2003), art. 17, online: Coalition Provisional Authority
<http: / / wwv.cpa-iraq.org/human--.rights/Statute.htm >.
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developed by the modern ad hoc tribunals, but the most germane for the purposes of
this discussion is Article 21, which for the first time in history elucidates sources of
international criminal law in a treaty. 106This provision states:
. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of
armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
wealth, birth or other status. 107
Article 21 of the Rome Statute is worded in a very cumbersome manner. It can
only be understood in the context in which it was drafted: by round after round of
negotiation and compromise. It raises the most theoretical as well as the most practi-
cal challenges to the viability of the international criminal law tradition. The justifica-
tion for the provision is both to provide a normative super structure to the tradition,
as well as fill gaps in the law to be applied. However, as will be seen, it may fail to meet
either of these objectives and risks undermining the entire project of the ICC.
A. Aims of the Applicable Law Provision
Why was a de jure provision on "applicable law" required in light of the defacto appli-
cable law provisions applied by the modern ad hoc tribunals and historical tribunals?
Without debating the content of such a provision, its mere existence is the first junc-
ture for analysis. Article 21 of the Rome Statute has been called "a tissue of imperfect-
ly defined sources,"08 and its adoption has been justified on several grounds-which
may be seen as recurring themes in the development of international criminal law.
106. Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, "Article 21: Applicable Law"in OttoTriffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) 435 at 438.
107. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 21. Art. 7(3) states: "For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the
term 'gender' refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term 'gender'
does not indicate any meaning different from the above."
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First, given the hybrid nature and recent development of this tradition, an
applicable law provision was thought necessary to resolve the challenges of"norma-
tive indeterminacy inherent in the development of international legal norms." 9 The
promise of Article 21 in this regard is to provide a normative framework or structure
for the entire legal world overseen by the ICC. Second, most commentators agree
that Article 21 was designed to serve a gap-filling function to address lacunae where
substantive, procedural or evidentiary rules are apparently lacking."" An important
distinction is made with respect to gap-filling in national law versus in the interna-
tional criminal law tradition. It has been recognized that national law is "anchored in
a fine network of legal norms [i.e. a legal tradition] that lay down rules that are intri-
cately interwoven with the codes.""' The problem is that international criminal law
has no longstanding tradition, only a tentative and uncertain existence with little the-
oretical basis. Without an established tradition behind it, international criminal law is
a law seeking out a tradition-hence the paradox of it being an emerging legal tradi-
tion. Ironically, this predicament is both the root of the problem that Article 21 of
the Rome Statute seeks to address, as well as the reason why Article 21 faces difficul-
ties in patching together a legal tradition.
As the analysis of the modern ad hoc tribunals demonstrates, however, resort
to transnational common laws has been used to fill the most difficult gaps in their
statutes, including the appropriate balance to be struck between extending humani-
tarian protection and fairness to the accused. The extent to which Article 21 con-
strains or condones this approach warrants attention. Before delving into this
analysis, however, it is necessary to situate Article 21 within the broader develop-
ments in the international criminal law tradition to understand its implications.
B. Separation from Public International Law Architecture
Article 21 of the Rome Statute represents a split, at least in part, from the dominance
of public international law in international criminal law. Public international law was
the foundation relied upon by the earlier international criminal tribunals. It has been
fatally undermined in Article 21. This is not to deny the strong and ongoing role of
public international law, but merely to identify that its exclusivity over international
criminal law is abolished in the Rome Statute. However, some scholars deny such a
break has taken place.
108. Alain Pellet, "Applicable Law" in Antonio Cassese et al., eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1051 at 1053.
109. McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 106 at 439.
110. J. Verhoeven, "Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the Ambiguities of Applicable Law" (2002)'33 Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law 3 at 17; McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 106 at 443; Kriangsak
Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Laiw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 ) at 52.
Ill. Pellet, supra note 108 at 1067.
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To begin with, Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman has noted that while the appli-
cable law provision in the Rome Statute is generally inspired by Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute, Article 21 "modifies the approach taken in the ICJ Statute to fit the context
of international criminal law."" 2 By the time of the Rome Conference, it was clear that
international criminal tribunals were applying Article 38 of the ICJ Statute as a mat-
ter of practice. Therefore, Article 21 of the Rome Statute must be viewed as a deliber-
ate attempt to modify this approach. There are important differences between these
provisions, which go to the heart of the international criminal law tradition. First,
while Article 38 of the ICJ Statute places each of its sources of law on equal footing
(with the exception of subsidiary sources such as judicial decisions and teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists), Article 21 of the Rome Statute establishes a hier-
archy or pyramid of sources. Secondly, there is no explicit mention of international
custom in Article 21 of the Rome Statute as there is in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute-
the former simply refers to "principles and rules of international law."' Third,
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute entrenches internationally recognized human rights
as infusing the "application and interpretation" of every source of law, whereas no
such provision appears in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. " 4 Fourth, Article 21 (1)(c) of
the Rome Statute represents a significant evolution of the concept of "general princi-
ples of law," which has been lauded as "bring[ing] useful precision to the definition of
general principles of law.""5 Alan Nissel argues that "this was the most controversial
source codified and distinguishes Article 21 of the Rome Statute from Article 38 of
the statute establishing the International Court of Justice.""6 Finally, the nature of
prior decisions of the ICC is defined differently in Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute,
compared to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute.
Despite these significant differences between Article 21 of the Rome Statute
and the general public international law sources, some prominent commentators
continue to deny any break has been made with the traditional sources of public
international law, as articulated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. These scholars still
hold to the view, in the face of the plain wording of Article 21 and the record of the
negotiations surrounding it, that public international law continues to reign within
the institutions created by the Rome Statute. In other words, they deny that the ICC
112. McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 106 at 436.
113. Rome Statute. supra note 2, art. 21. See also Alan Nissel, "Continuing Crimes in the Rome Statute" (2004) 25
Mich. J. Int'l L. 653, at n. 142, who states: "while it is clear that custom is included in Article 21, it appears
that the reason why 'custom' was not explicitly mentioned was because the concept of gradually evolving
custom was considered too imprecise for the purposes of international criminal law."
114. Rome Statute, ibid., art. 21(3).
115. Pellet, supra note 108 at 1082.
116. Nissel, supro note 113 at n. 19.
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will be applying a law sui generis. M. Cherif Bassiouni argues that Article 10 of the
Rome Statute "requires the application of international law whose four sources are list-
ed in Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of Justice.""7 Article 10 of
the Rome Statute provides, "Inlothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international lawfor purposes
other than this Statute.""'
Bassiouni's argument is quite weak and his denial that the international criminal
law world changed after Article 21 is not convincing. It may be easily dispatched by
focusing on the explicit wording in Article 10 of the Rome Statute which states" for pur-
poses other than this Statute." Therefore, for the purposes of the Statute, Article 21
would be wholly and completely applicable. The ICC, as a creature of the Rome Statute,
is governed by this treaty as its constitutional document. Despite the customary nature
in international law of the sources articulated in Article 38 of the IC] Statute, the ICC is
bound first to consider the provisions of its own statute that have been crafted for the
specific purposes to which the ICC is directed. It is entirely indefensible to argue that
an international court should disregard a provision in its own statute in favor of an anal-
ogous, but different, provision in another international court's statute. Such an
approach would run afoul of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 19 which properly and squarely applies to the interpretation to be given to the
Rome Statute itself. Interestingly, Bassiouni agrees that the ICC must apply these inter-
pretive canons, making his argument contradictory. 120 Therefore, Article 21 of the Rome
Statute represents a split from strict adherence to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and in so
doing, divorces international criminal law from the possibility of claiming public inter-
national law, with its thousands of years of history and traditions, as being the exclusive
anchor for the law applied by the ICC in concrete cases.
C. Restraint in Judicial Law-Making
Another important aspect of the international criminal law tradition which has been
seriously challenged in the Rome Statute is the role of international judges as law-
makers. One of the leading commentaries on the Rome Statute describes the funda-
mental debate on the role of judges at the ICC, and how Article 21 became a
battleground on the issue:
Two principle schools of thought emerged at the Preparatory Committee meetings
regarding the appropriate degree of judicial discretion in discerning applicable law.
A minority of States took the position that the principle of legality requires the virtual
117. Bassiouni, supra note 6 at 501.
118. Rome Statutc, supra note 2, art. 10 lemphasis addedi.
119. Supra note 11.
120. Bassiouni, supra note 6 at 501.
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elimination of judicial discretion in the criminal law context. Any doubt as to the relevant
legal provision should be resolved, according to this view, by direct application of the
appropriate domestic law. The majority position, on the other hand, sought to accommo-
date the unique nature of the international legal order by allowing the judges to discern
and apply general principles of international criminal law. Article 2 1 represents a com-
promise between these two schools of thought .... 121
There is no agreement in the literature, however, on whether the Rome Statute
as a whole has effectively altered the scope of authority of international judges to "make
law." While some argue that "Article 21, therefore, accords a great deal of discretion to
the judges of the ICC,"' 22 others claim "they [the drafters] have shown a mistrust for the
judge that is reflected in a large number of other provisions of the Statute."112 3 While the
judges of the post-World War II and modern ad hoc tribunals were entrusted with
adopting and amending their Rules of Procedure and Evidence, this power is largely
denied to the judges of the ICC. Pursuant to Article 51 of the Rome Statute, the ICC
Rules of Procedure and Evidence "shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds
majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties."'24 Article 51(3) provides an
exceptional procedure for provisional amendments of these rules by the judges: "[fln
urgent cases where the Rules do not provide for a specific situation before the Court,
the judges may, by a two-thirds majority, draw up provisional Rules to be applied until
adopted, amended or rejected at the next ordinary or special session of the Assembly of
States Parties."2 ' For its part, Rule 63(5) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence
prohibits any direct application of national laws, reinforcing the authority of Article 21
in a redundant manner, stating "Itihe Chambers shall not apply national laws governing
evidence, other than in accordance with article 21 .126
Another limitation on the law-making abilities of the ICC judges is the exis-
tence of the Elements of Crimes which must also be adopted by two-thirds of the
Assembly of States Parties. Article 9 of the Rome Statute provides that the Elements of
Crimes "shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and
8 [genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes].' 12 7 The use of the mandatory
term "shall" with the permissive term "assist" is a strange combination. Again, the rea-
son for this lies in the nature of the Rome Statute as a negotiated treaty: "Some delega-
121. McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 106 at 436.
122. Ibid. at 439.
123. Pellet, supra note 108 at 1056.
124. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 51 (1).
125. Ibid.,art. 51(3).
126. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, I" Sess., NewYork, 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/I/3-10, r. 63(5), online: ICC
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialiournal/basicdocmnents/asp-records(e).pdf> ICC Rules].
127. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 9 [emphasis added].
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tions, led by the US, wanted the Elements of Crimes to bind the ICC judges so as to
ensure certainty and clarity of the law of the Rome Statute. Other delegations opposed
restriction on the ICC judges in their interpretation of international criminal law." 2'
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on the Elements
of Crimes insists they "are to be used as an interpretative aid and are not binding upon
the judges.The elements must 'be consistent with this Statute' and it should be empha-
sised that consistency with the Statute must be determined by the Court."2 9
Notwithstanding the apparent limitations on their law-making powers, it has
been postulated "that the judges will interpret the text [of Article 21], at least par-
tially, so as to recover the powers inherent in all courts, of which the drafters of the
Statute clearly wanted to deprive them." 3 While this may be true of substantive law
given the non-binding nature of the Elements of Crimes and their cursory nature,
within the realm of procedural and evidentiary law the foregoing analysis demon-
strates that there has been a genuine attempt to limit judicial discretion.
D. Deepening Divisions Between Humanitarian Protection & Fairness
to Accused
Rather than attempting to reconcile the tension inherent in the international crimi-
nal law tradition between extending humanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness
to the accused, the Rome Statute has only deepened these divisions.
Extending humanitarian protection inevitably occurred in the Rome Statute,
given that numerous humanitarian organizations were involved in negotiations. The
Rome Statute is not merely a codification of existing substantive law. For example, the
ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreskic found that Article 7(1 )(h) of the Rome Statute on per-
secution as a crime against humanity "is not consonant with customary international
law," '3 and therefore refused to follow it. With respect to evidentiary and procedural
law, there are several provisions in the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence that invoke
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute to extend humanitarian protection based on human
rights norms. Allowances are made for the testimony of victims of sexual violence in
Rule 72, based in part on the need to comply with internationally recognized human
rights.' Likewise, Rule 145(2)(b)(v) identifies as an aggravating circumstance in sen-
tencing the "Iclommission of the crime for any motive involving discrimination on any
of the grounds referred to in article 21, paragraph 3 ... ,
128. Kittichaisaree, supra note 110 at 51.
129. Knut 36rmann, Louise Doswald-Beck & Robert Kolb, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 8.
130. Pellet, supra note 108 at 1053.
131. Kupreskic, supra note 89 at para. 580.
132. See ICC Rules, supra note 126, r. 72(2).
133. Ibid., r. 145(2)(b)(v).
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Enhancing fairness to the accused is also embedded in the Rome Statute, flow-
ing from the efforts of human rights and criminal law advocates during the negotia-
tions. It has been argued that there are many examples of the "'victory' of the
criminal law approach over the internationalist vision."1 4 In particular, it has been
asserted that "the word 'custom' was excluded [in Article 211, . . . due to the fact that
the criminal lawyers, whose influence increased during the drafting of the Statute,
opposed it in the name of an erroneous conception of the principle of the legality of
offences and punishment."3 The need for clarity in provisions holding individuals
criminally responsible is repeatedly stressed in the commentary on Article 21 .136
International human rights law, which operated as a powerful normative vehicle
at the ad hoc tribunals, has become formally entrenched in the applicable law of the ICC.
While no one would disagree that international human rights norms must inform inter-
national trials, Article 21 has taken the unprecedented step of raising all such norms to
the level of quasi-constitutional status in a manner that can allow the judges of the ICC
to effectively rewrite international criminal law with the stroke of a pen. Article 21(3)
of the Rome Statute "mandates that the interpretation of the Statute should 'be consistent
with internationally recognized human rights.'Though this phrase obviously refers to the
rights of the accused, it can also be read to include the rights of the victims, which opens
the door to a more aggressive mode of prosecution."17 Under this view, with respect to
the accused, the application and interpretation of the sources of law in Article 21 (1) must
be consistent with human rights, such that "procedural rules must be construed so as to
not infringe the right to a fair trial."3 8 More controversially, Article 2 1 (3) may enable the
ICC to declare existing rules of international law to be inapplicable due to inconsisten-
cy with human rights norms. "' Notably, Article 21(3) does not simply refer tojus cogens
norms, or even 'fundamental human rights, traditionally quoted as examples of peremp-
tory rules, but to all internationally recognized human rights." 40 As a result, the concept
and scope of human rights norms that may be employed to interpret and develop law at
the ICC is potentially vast.
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E. Ongoing Role of Transnational Common Laws
Recalling that one of the aims of Article 21 of the Rome Statute is to fill gaps in the law,
and given that Glenn's theory of transnational common laws operate to fill gaps where
there are no particular rules applicable, 14 1 does Article 21 open the door to transna-
tional common laws? At least from a theoretical perspective, an affirmative answer may
be reasonably given to this question. Notably, the final element of Glenn's theory is
given a home in Article 21, since different law may apply to different individuals. In the
context of criminal proceedings this presents a challenge to the rule of law.
Given that Article 21 is a hierarchical delineation of sources of law, the final
source is where one must look to see if transnational common laws may operate.
Article 21(1 )(c) provides as a last resort that the ICC shall apply
general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of
the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsis-
tent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms
and standards. 142
Despite complaints of complexity in this wording, there is an emerging consensus in
the literature that this provision confers "a wide discretionary power"' 4 on judges,
"will provide ample opportunities for judicial creativity"' 4 "allows the ICC to resort
to drawing inspiration from case law in the criminal field decided by national courts
of the various legal systems of the world,"' 45 and leaves it to judicial discretion to
determine which legal systems will be considered, 46 with the most likely candidates
"reduced to a small number in the contemporary world: the family of civil-law coun-
tries, the common law, and, perhaps, Islamic law."'147These views aggregate to make a
powerful case that the basic characteristics of transnational common laws exist in
Article 21 (1 )(c) of the Rome Statute, that they are non-binding but persuasive laws that
may fill gaps where particular law is silent and depend on collaboration among judges.
This leaves the most controversial aspect of Glenn's theory of transnational
common laws to be considered, namely, that it contemplates the possibility of differ-
ent law applying to different people. As noted in Part II, this characteristic has not
been clearly operating in this tradition in the past. However, Article 21 (1)(c) of the
141. See discussion in Part II, above, based on Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 18 at 62, 45.
142. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 21(I)(c).
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Rome Statute has authorized such a practice by approving, as a last resort, application
of "the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
crime." '48 The drafting history of this provision sheds some light on what is meant by
the "States that would normally exercise jurisdiction." An earlier proposal identified
these as "first to the national law of the State where the crime was committed, sec-
ond to the laws of the State of nationality of the accused, and third to the laws of the
custodial State."' 49 Given that this specific proposal was considered, but not adopt-
ed, it could also reasonably be held that based on passive personality jurisdiction
under international law, the national laws of the victim's state could also be consult-
ed in the case of an international armed conflict, systematic attack, or genocide. It
is not possible to interpret Article 21 (1 )(c) of the Rome Statute as authorizing the
application of the particular law of only one of these states, since it refers in the plu-
ral to the "national laws of States." Therefore, Article 21(1 )(c) would operate to fill
gaps first by considering legal systems (or traditions) of the world seeking broad
consensus. If judges do not find such agreement, as in Erdemovic, then they would
examine the smaller subset of national laws that would ordinarily apply on the facts
of the particular case. While there could be multiple national laws applicable, in
cases of non-international armed conflicts it is conceivable that only one state would
normally have jurisdiction.
For example, in the Uganda situation that is presently before the ICC, where
a perpetrator is a member of the Lord's Resistance Army and a Ugandan national, the
conflict is in northern Uganda, the victim is Ugandan, and if the accused is appre-
hended and held in custody in Uganda before transfer to the ICC, then only Uganda
would normally exercise jurisdiction, and Ugandan law would only be applied at the
ICC as a last resort. In the end, however, Ugandan law could be rendered inapplica-
ble if it is "inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internation-
ally recognized norms and standards."50 This would be the ultimate situation of
non-liquet. There would, theoretically, be no answer. If, however, the Ugandan law
met this requirement, it would be applied by the ICC. In a case dealing with another
non-international armed conflict, the law of that State could be applicable. We are
thus faced with the possibility of different law applying to different accused persons.
For scholars who have seriously considered this provision's implications,
there has been an allergic reaction to this possibility, but they have fallen short of
recognizing that Article 21 has the potential to undermine the rule of law.
Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, for example, notes that this "particularized
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approach would undermine the consistent application of the law to different
accused."' 5' This brings us to the final major implication of Article 21 for the inter-
national criminal law tradition.
F. Nature of Prior Decisions of the ICC Indeterminate
A decision will need to be made by the ICC about whether it will tolerate different
law applying to different accused, or if after it makes the very first "particularized"
decision based on the subset of national laws of states that would normally exercise
jurisdiction, it will opt instead to follow that decision in future cases as enabled under
Article 21(2). The wording of this provision on the nature of prior decisions of the
ICC is otherwise quite uninteresting, at least at first blush:" 2 "The Court may apply
principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions."' It has been rec-
ognized that this is a "discretionary use of precedent ... [that] ... represents a com-
promise between the common law approach to judicial decisions as binding
precedent, and the traditional civil law view that judicial pronouncements in specific
cases bind only the parties before the court."114 Some commentators have predicted
that the ICC will simply adopt the same approach as the modern ad hoc tribunals, dis-
cussed in Part 11, regarding the treatment of their past decisions.'55
It is possible that Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute carries more significant
implications for the international criminal law tradition than has been envisaged to
date. The first possibility, which is the approach of the modern ad hoc tribunals, is to
build a body of jurisprudence over time that initially draws heavily on sources exter-
nal to the tribunals, but increasingly relies on the tribunal's own jurisprudence over
time, looking outside their walls only to fill lacunae. This is also inherent in the tai-
lored doctrine of precedent developed by the modern ad hoc tribunals, discussed in
Part II. This standard appears to be more stringent than that appearing in Article
21(2) of the Rome Statute, which is completely permissive in apparently allowing the
judges to disregard or apply their prior decisions at will. It would be open to the
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152. Verhoeven, supra note I 10 at 13, notes: "Obviously, it would be sheer nonsense to affirm that the Court is
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judges at the ICC to follow the lead of the modern ad hoc tribunals. Indeed, many
expect that "the ICC will facilitate the uniform and consistent application of interna-
tional criminal law. By rendering judgments in concrete cases and developing a con-
sistent jurisprudence, the ICC may clarify and even develop international criminal
law."15 6 In this way, Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute would increasingly operate, as the
ICC begins to decide issues in concrete cases, to resolve legal issues without resort to
the other sources of law in Article 21 (1)(b),(c). This would suggest a phased devel-
opment of the ICC's jurisprudence, and a gradual closing of the porous borders of
international criminal law to other legal traditions.
The second possibility would be for the ICC to rely on Article 21(2) of the
Rome Statute, likely in conjunction with Article 21(3), to proactively develop interna-
tional criminal law with only a loose concept of precedent. Any prior decision with
which the judges simply did not agree based on prevailing human rights principles
could be disregarded. A dynamic normative order would be created, constantly
adapting to new situations and conflicts. This possibility appears to be authorized
based on the wording of Article 21.
In either of these models, the ICC has the potential, through the operation of
Article 21(2), to bring into existence "a new legal order of international law"'57 invoking
the language used by the European Court of Justice to describe its sui generis character.
IV. CONCLUSION
International criminal law's emergence in the wake of the darkest periods of human his-
tory has placed pressures on it that few other areas of law have had to endure. It was
forced into the courtroom in advance of a clear articulation of what law the judges hear-
ing international criminal trials were to apply. The legitimacy of such an exercise after
World War II faced serious challenges that have only resurfaced as Article 21 of the Rome
Statute has attempted anew to refashion the normative structure underlying interna-
tional criminal law. These challenges include the need to transcend often divergent
national laws within untested and ad hoc institutions. In many ways international crim-
inal law exists at the intersection of well-established legal traditions, each seeking to
exert their influence on its development. This article has demonstrated that these
established traditions do not simply apply as sources of customary international law, but
as transnational common laws that are persuasive, non-binding, and derived by judges
of international criminal tribunals in a highly discretionary manner in difficult cases.
The benefit of ad hoc institutions is that we can learn from them and adapt, such that
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new generations of institutions may be crafted and improved upon. A major drawback
of the creation of a permanent international criminal court is that prospects for reform
are likely to be less expedient as institution inertia sets in over the years.
At the root of the discretionary selection by judges among the possible sources
of norms is a competition between fundamental principles of the international crimi-
nal law tradition. On one hand, there is the need to enhance humanitarian protection
to victims, an ideal embedded in international humanitarian law and particularly the
Martens Clause. On the other hand, there is the aim of maximizing fairness to the
accused, an ideal enshrined in the growing body of international human rights law and
codified in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. This contest of values has been
the pivotal turning point in resolving legal issues before the modern ad hoc tribunals in
several difficult cases where traditional sources of law have failed to provide an answer.
In some of these decisions, this dilemma has been laid bare in the reasoning of the
judges, whereas in others it has been kept hidden in their stated reasons.
It is a finding of some significance that international criminal tribunals histori-
cally could not simply rely upon the general sources of public international law in
resolving difficult cases. Even public international law failed to provide a sufficient
anchor for international criminal law. It is perhaps even more significant looking for-
ward that Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the ICC ends the monopoly of these gener-
al sources of public international law that were supposedly the foundation of the
jurisprudence of the modern ad hoc tribunals, replacing it with a new normative regime
that is variable and indeterminate.
As has been shown on a theoretical basis, Article 21 of the Rome Statute has not
resolved fundamental tensions and challenges inherent in the international criminal law
tradition. Rather, it has potentially exacerbated these ideological conflicts. Despite
seeking to serve a gap-filling function, Article 21 may fail to do so satisfactorily. While
recrafting the relationship between international criminal law and other national legal
traditions, Article 21 broadens the ability of judges to resort to transnational common
laws. The ongoing development of international criminal law is an open question due
to Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute, which leaves it to the judges of the ICC to deter-
mine whether to adopt a system of non-binding precedent, or to opt for a dynamic
jurisprudence which evolves in accordance with Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute to
reflect changes in internationally recognized human rights. Until the ICC definitively
and consistently articulates its position on the precedential value of its decisions, the
strength of the rule of law will be in doubt in its jurisprudence.
A great deal of hope has been placed in international criminal law that it can
effectively enforce international humanitarian law obligations. There are high but some-
times shaken expectations in its ability to administer international justice in a fair and
efficient manner, while at the same time being receptive to national laws as well as
emerging international human rights standards. These aspirations will be better served
if more attention is paid to the foundational aspects of this emerging legal tradition
which has been given a degree of permanency in the ICC.

